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Sexual objectification, in the broadest terms, involves (at least) treating people 
as things. Philosophers have offered different accounts of what, more precisely, 
this involves. According to the conjoint view of Catherine Mackinnon and Sally 
Haslanger, sexual objectification is necessarily morally objectionable. According 
to Martha Nussbaum, it is not: there can be benign instances of it, in the course of 
a healthy sexual relationship, for instance. This is taken to be a serious 
disagreement, both by Nussbaum and by recent commentators such as Lina Papadaki. (owever it isnǯt a serious disagreement, for the two theories have 
different aims and methodology, and are not rivals. They both could be apt, 
simultaneously. 
 
1. MacKinnon-Haslanger account 
 
I treat this as a single account, since Haslanger is strongly influenced by 
MacKinnon, offering a systematized version of her view with certain additions. 
Haslanger writes, reconstructing MacKinnon: 
 
If one objectifies something (or someone), one views it and treats it as an object for the satisfaction of oneǯs desire; but this is not all, for 
objectification is assumed to be a relation of domination where one also has the power to enforce oneǯs view. Objectification is not just ǲin the headǳ; it is actualized, embodied, imposed upon the objects of oneǯs 
desire. So if one objectifies something, one not only views it as something which would satisfy oneǯs desire, but one also has the power to make it 
have the properties one desires it to have. A good objectifier will, when 
the need arises—that is, when the object lacks the desired properties—
exercise his power to make the object have the properties he desires 
(2012: 64-65). 
 
In the background is a theory of gender as constituted by hierarchical social 
relations: men are, constitutionally, objectifiers, and women are, constitutionally, 
objectified (MacKinnon 1987; Haslanger 2012: 56).  Prominent features of the 
view are, as indicated, that: a) objectification involves both seeing and treating 
another person as mere means to oneǯs own ends; bȌ it is an attitude backed up 
by the power to enforce. What makes objectification sexual is, first, that it 
involves subordination to menǯs sexual interests; and that it is eroticized: that 
woman are to be sexually subordinated is experienced as what is erotic about 
women, both by men and by women too (MacKinnon 1987: 54). 
 
A further feature of the view, developed by Haslanger, is that objectification 
involves epistemic as well as moral harm: it involves falsely believing the objectified to have a nature which Ǯmakes it desirable in the ways one desires, 
and which enables it to satisfy that desireǯ ȋ2012: 66). Objectified people are 
seen as naturally suited to satisfying the desires that their objectifiers have 
towards them.  
 
In short, on this view: 
 
 ǮTo be sexually objectified means having a social meaning imposed on 
your being that defines you as to be sexually used, according to your 
desired uses, and then using you that wayǯ ȋMacKinnon ͳͻͺͻ: 327) 
 
2. Nussbaum-Langton account Nussbaum treats Ǯsexual objectificationǯ as 
 Ǯ…a relatively loose cluster-term, for whose application we sometimes 
treat any one of these features as sufficient, though more often a plurality 
of features is present when the term is appliedǯ. ȋͳͻͻͷ: 258) 
 
The relevant features she identifies as follows (1995: 275).  An objectifier 
perceives or treats the objectified as some or all of the following: as an 
instrument; as lacking in autonomy; as inert or lacking in agency; as fungible; as 
violable; as capable of being owned; as lacking in subjectivity and whose 
experiences and feelings, if any, are irrelevant. To this list Rae Langton (2009: 
228-230), building on Nussbaumǯs theory, proposes to add: as reduced to its 
body, or body parts; as reduced to appearances; as silent and lacking the capacity 
to speak. Because of these non-destructive additions, I'm referring to the 
conjoined version of these views as the Nussbaum-Langton account. 
 
Unlike MacKinnon-Haslanger, the Nussbaum-Langton account does not make sexual objectification constitutively tied to gender roles: one of Nussbaumǯs 
examples is of a man objectifying another man (1995: 253). Objectification can 
be a way of perceiving people, as well as or instead of treating them a certain way: this is both explicit in Nussbaumǯs formulation, and in Langtonǯs additions. 
For this reason, it does not necessarily involve any force or threat of force.  
Relatedly, it isnǯt necessarily harmful - or more strictly speaking, not all forms of 
objectification are necessarily harmful. Consensual instrumentalisation of 
another person–e.g. by using them as a Ǯpillowǯ to lean on - can be fine 
(Nussbaum 1995: 265); moreover, even where there is a temporary Ǯsurrender of autonomyǯ in sex, resulting in being objectified, this is permissible so long as generally, the Ǯcontext is… one in which, on the whole, autonomy is respected and promotedǯ ȋͳͻͻͷ: ʹ͹ͷȌ. In discussion, Langton introduces further distinctions in what one may Ǯdoǯ to autonomy in the course of objectification: one may be Ǯfailing to attribute it, violating it, surrendering it, demanding that another surrender it, destroying it, stifling itǯ ȋʹͲͲͻ: ʹ͵͸-7), with consequences 
for whether the objectification in question counts as morally harmful or not. 
Finally, sexual objectification apparently counts as sexual because it occurs in the 
context of a sexual relationship, though need not involve sexual behaviour (as in leaning on a loverǯs stomach for a pillowȌ. 
 
3. No real dispute here 
Is sexual objectification necessarily morally harmful, or not? Nussbaum argues 
that it is not, since there can (on her view) be benign instances of it, and criticizes MacKinnonǯs view for being Ǯinsufficiently sensitiveǯ to such Ǯhuman complexitiesǯ (1995: 273). Papadaki (2010) takes Nussbaum to be at odds with 
MacKinnon on the question of whether objectification is necessarily harmful, and 
criticizes both in favour of her own view. Equally, one might take there to be 
substantive disagreements between MacKinnon-Nussbaum and Haslanger-
Langton on: whether objectification is essentially epistemically harmful; whether 
it is essentially tied to gender relations; whether it can involve merely perceiving 
a person in a particular way, or must involve action; or why exactly it counts as 
sexual. Yet the appearance of all such disagreements is illusory. For the two 
theories are engaged in different projects and are not in competition. 
 
There are various things one might be doing, in offering a theory of 
objectification. On the one hand, one might be offering an account of 
objectification (italicized to denote concern with the concept), as itǯs employed in 
ordinary usage. Nussbaum-Langton is doing this ȋͳͻͻͷ:ʹͷʹȌ. )tǯs for this reason a 
cluster account is offered: it would be optimistic to think ordinary users applied 
the concept in a way which revealed some underlying tight set of necessary and sufficient conditions. )tǯs also for this reason that objectification is characterized 
so broadly. This presumably reflects the fact that, unless the concept is a 
technically introduced one for some strict purpose, ordinary usage of a concept 
tends to range in an increasingly widespread way over contexts, as morals and 
preferences or habits of use change or expand.  
 
MacKinnnon- Haslanger is engaged in a different project. Its aim, I take it, can be 
summarised in the following story, simplified to its essentials. The authors think 
they have noticed some morally problematic activity in the world: the forced 
treatment of a certain group of people for the sexual ends and interests of 
another group of people, in a way which harms that group. Having noticed it, 
they want to name it, and to explain its origin in a particular social context, its 
relationship to gender and sexuality, and consequences. The name they have for this activity is ǲsexual objectificationǳ; they introduce this term quasi-
stipulatively to refer to the phenomenon they have noticed.  
 
This interpretation allows us to understand features of their view relatively undramatically. The behaviour they name gets to count as Ǯnecessarily morally 
problematicǯ because the phenomenon they wish to name comes already 
identified in moral terms, in that this is how it presents itself and is identified as such; it involves ǲdominationǳ, ǲforceǳ, ǲusing others as mere meansǳ, and other 
terms indicative of autonomy-violation. Similarly, the behaviour they name picks 
out a phenomenon essentially epistemically harmful/ tied to gender/ eroticized, 
etc. because this is a feature of the behaviour they want to name as such. 
 
To sum up: for Nussbaum-Langton, there is non-harmful sexual objectification, 
because the folk identify certain activities as objectification which are not picked 
out in essentially moral terms, and so are not always harmful, though they may 
frequently be contingently so. MacKinnon-Langton does not allow non-harmful 
sexual objectification because that was not what the authors intended to name 
by the appellation of ǲsexual objectificationǳ, and they are relatively uninterested 
in how the folk may refer to things. Their use of the same term as Nussbaum-
Langton does not imply they intend to use this name in a way that reflects the 
way it has historically been used or is used by others.  Of course, their usage of Ǯsexual objectificationǯ as a term is apt, inasumuch as what they refer to can be 
recognised as a way of treating people as objects. But they apparently have no pretensions towards uncovering or even Ǯcleaning upǯ existing usage, nor in 
being exhaustive. If this is the right way to look at things, then MacKinnon-(aslanger isnǯt in competition with Nussbaum-Langton, since the theoretical 
aims are different. The criterion of success of Nussbaum-Langton is whether it 
captures all the significant contexts in which the concept is ordinarily applied. 
The criterion of success for MacKinnon-Haslanger is whether it offers 
explanatory value: a useful way of grouping observed phenomena in the world, 
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Sexual objectification, in the broadest terms, involves (at least) treating people 
as things. Philosophers have offered different accounts of what, more precisely, 
this involves. According to the conjoint view of Catherine Mackinnon and Sally 
Haslanger, sexual objectification is necessarily morally objectionable. According 
to Martha Nussbaum, it is not: there can be benign instances of it, in the course of 
a healthy sexual relationship, for instance. This is taken to be a serious 
disagreement, both by Nussbaum and by recent commentators such as Lina 
Papadaki. However it isnǯt a serious disagreement, for the two theories have 
different aims and methodology, and are not rivals. They both could be apt, 
simultaneously1. 
 
                                                        
1 The material here is drawn from talks given at the 2014 Evaluative Perception 
conference, University of Glasgow; the Philosophy Departments of UC Irvine, the 
Open University and Manchester; and the British Society of Aesthetics 
Cambridge Lecture Series. Thanks to audiences for their helpful questions and 
comments.  For a positive theory of objectification, see Stock (MS, forthcoming). 
